



The TPM requires the use of nonvolatile memory for two general classes of data:
Data structures defined by the TPM architecture.•	
Unstructured data defined by a user or a platform-specific •	
specification
One use of TPM nonvolatile memory is for architecturally defined data, or fields 
defined in the TPM library specification. This includes hierarchy authorization values, 
seeds and proofs, and private data that the TPM won’t reveal outside its secure boundary. 
It also includes counters, a clock, and more: nonvolatile data that the caller can read. 
Nonvolatile memory can also hold structured data made persistent, such as a key.
This section describes a second use of NV memory: unstructured platform or user-
defined space. This is sometimes called a user-defined index, because the user assigns an 
index (a handle) to each area and accesses data using the index value.
TPM 1.2 includes user-defined indexes that can hold unstructured data. The 
user defines the size and attributes of the index. The user can write data without any 
restriction on the data value. The TPM provides authorization, controlling access to the 
index via a shared secret keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) key, Platform 
Configuration Register (PCR) values, locality, and physical presence, and provides 
various read and write locks.
TPM 2.0 expands the 1.2 features in several ways:
An index can have the state “uninitialized, not yet written.” Reads •	
will fail until the index is first written. Further, the index can’t be 
used in a policy. A party relying on a value can be assured that a 
party with write authority initialized the index and that the data 
doesn’t simply have a default or uninitialized value.
As with any other protected entity, TPM 2.0 indexes may have •	
either an authorization value or a policy.
Another entity’s policy can include an NV index value. The policy •	
specifies an operation to be performed on all or part of the index 
value: a comparison to policy data. The operations include equal, 
not equal, signed, and unsigned comparisons, and a check for bits 
set or clear.
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Another new NV index feature is the data type. It augments the 1.2 unstructured data 






An ordinary index is like a TPM 1.2 index. It holds unstructured data of arbitrary length. 
In contrast with counter, bit-field, and extend indexes, there is no restriction on the type 
of data that can be written.
USE CASE: STORING A SECRET
a platform contains a 20-byte secret that must be available early in a boot cycle. It 
stores the secret in an NV index. the index attribute TPMA_NV_PPREAD specifies 
that reads require platform authorization. the platform software, running early in the 
boot cycle, knows this authorization and so can read the secret. It’s trusted not to 
reveal the secret once it completes its task. Because other software later in the boot 
cycle or beyond doesn’t know the platform authorization, it can’t read the secret.
the tpM commands are as follows:
 • TPM2_NV_DefineSpace: Create an ordinary index,  
size = 20 bytes, with platform authorization to read and write
 • TPM2_NV_Read: Uses platform authorization
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USE CASE: STORING A CERTIFICATE
a platform OeM creates a certificate stating that an endorsement key is fixed to the 
platform and that the platform was manufactured with certain security guarantees. 
the OeM stores the certificate in NV during manufacturing. read access is 
unrestricted. Write access is restricted by policy to the OeM and is used to update 
the certificate.
the tpM commands are as follows:
 • TPM2_NV_DefineSpace: Create an ordinary index, size 
of certificate, platform authorization to write, read with 
authorization value, and a null (zero-length) password
 • TPM2_NV_Write: run with platform authorization
 • TPM2_NV_Read: run with a null password
USE CASE: STORING A COMMON PASSWORD
a user creates a set of keys with an identical policy, authorizing use if a password in 
the NV authorization field is known. the user permits access to all keys by supplying 
the correct secret value. the user writes one NV location to change the common 
password for all keys.
the tpM commands are as follows:
1. TPM2_NV_DefineSpace: ordinary index, size = 0 bytes 
(the NV data is not used in this use case), common 
password, policy password to change authorization.
2. Create a common policy: TPM2_PolicySecret with the 
name of the NV index.
3. TPM2_Create: Creates multiple keys with the common 
policy. userWithAuth is clear so that a policy is 
mandatory.
4. TPM2_NV_ChangeAuth: Changes the password for all keys 
in one operation, using the current password.
Chapter 11 ■ NV INdexes
140
USE CASE: STORING A ROOT PUBLIC KEY
the It administrator places the hash of a public key in NVraM, which is locked 
so the user can’t write to it. It’s used to verify a public key, which is used in turn 
to verify that signatures are from It. Or it’s the hash of the root public key of the 
certificate chain.
the tpM commands are as follows:
1. It creates the signing key and digests the public key.
2. Create a read policy: TPM2_PolicyCommandCode with the 
command TPM2_NV_Read. this policy allows anyone to 
read the index essentially without authorization.
3. TPM2_NV_DefineSpace - ordinary index, size = digest 
size, It administrator password, password to write, policy to 
read with the above read policy.
4. TPM2_NV_Write - with the It admin password, storing the 
public key digest.
and here’s how to verify a signature:
1. TPM2_NV_Read read the public key digest.
2. Validate the public key against the digest.
3. Validate the signature against the public key.
USE CASE: STORING AN HMAC KEY
In the Linux Integrity Measurement architecture (IMa) extended Verification Module 
(eVM), store an hMaC key that is released to the kernel early in the boot and then 
used by the kernel to verify the extended attributes of files to see that they have 
been approved for loading or use by the kernel.
the tpM commands are as follows:
 • TPM2_NV_DefineSpace - ordinary index, size = hMaC key 
size, It administrator password, password to write, policy to 
read with the above (anyone can read) read policy
 • TPM2_NV_Write: With the It admin password, stores the 
hMaC key
 • TPM2_NV_Read: reads the hMaC key
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NV Counter Index
An NV counter is a 64-bit value that can only increment. At the beginning of the first 
increment command, it’s initialized to the largest value that any counter has ever had on 
the TPM. This includes counter indexes currently defined and counters that were defined 
in the past but are no longer on the TPM. Thus a counter can never roll back, even by 
deleting and re-creating the index.
TPM 1.2 users might be familiar with monotonic counters. These NV counters are 
the equivalent, but the user is free to define none or as many as are needed up to TPM 
resource limits.
USE CASE: REVOKING ACCESS TO A KEY
a key holder wants to revoke access to a key. the key is created with a policy that 
says the key can be used (the policy can be satisfied) as long as the counter value is 
equal to its current value. Incrementing the counter revokes access.
the tpM commands are as follows:
TPM2_NV_DefineSpace: counter index, password of key holder, password to write, 
and a policy to read. the policy is TPM2_PolicyCommandCode with the command 
TPM2_PolicyNV. this policy allows anyone to use the index in a policy essentially 
without authorization.
TPM2_Create: Create a key with userWithAuth clear, requiring a policy to 
authorize the key. the policy is TPM2_PolicyNV with the NV value equal to all zero.
TPM2_NV_Increment: revokes authorization to use the key.
NV Bit Field Index
A bit field contains 64 bits, initialized to all bits clear at the beginning of the first write, 
which can also optionally set bits. A bit (or bits) can then be set but never cleared.
USE CASE: MULTIPLE-USER KEY REVOCATION
a key holder wants to grant and later revoke access to a key for up to 64 users. 
the key is created with a policy with up to 64 Or terms. each term combines some 
authorization specific to each user (a biometric or smart card digital signature, for 
example) and an assigned bit being clear. the key is revoked for that user by setting 
the bit in the NV bit field.
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the tpM commands are as follows:
TPM2_NV_DefineSpace: bit field index, password of key holder, password to write, 
and a policy to read. the policy is TPM2_PolicyCommandCode with the command 
TPM2_PolicyNV. this policy allows anyone to use the index in a policy essentially 
without authorization.
TPM2_Create: Create a key with userWithAuth clear, requiring a policy to 
authorize the key. the policy is TPM2_PolicyNV with the operand TPM_EO_
BITCLEAR (the bit assigned to the user is clear).
TPM2_NV_SetBits: setting the bit assigned to the user, thus revoking authorization 
to use the key.
NV Extend Index
An extend index is defined with a specified hash algorithm, and it’s fixed for the lifetime 
of the index. The data size of the index is based on its hash algorithm. It’s initialized to all 
zero before the first write. The write is an extend operation, similar to that performed on 
a PCR.
The most likely use case combines an extend and a hybrid index to create flexible 
PCRs, as discussed in the “Hybrid Index” section. Another general use case is a secure audit 
log, because any extend operation creates a cryptographic history that can’t be reversed.
USE CASE: SECURE AUDIT LOG OF CA KEY USE
a certificate authority wants to log each time its key is used to sign a certificate.  
It wants to be able to detect whether the log, kept on disk, has been altered. It creates 
an NV extend index for which it has exclusive write authority through a policy.
each time the Ca signs a new certificate, it logs the certificate and extends a digest 
of the certificate into the NV index. to validate the log, it walks the log, re-creating 
the extend value, and compares it to the NV index value. For additional security, it 
can even get a signature over the NV index value.
the tpM commands are as follows:
 • TPM2_NV_DefineSpace: extend index, policy to write 
by Ca, and a policy to read by anyone. the Ca signs a 
certificate, logs the certificate in an audit log, and digests 
the certificate.
 • TPM2_NV_Extend: adds the digest to the NV audit log. If 
the certificate is small enough, it can be extended directly. 
however, it’s probably faster to digest outside the tpM and 
extend just a digest.
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Hybrid Index
Yet another new TPM 2.0 feature is the hybrid index. As with a nonhybrid, the NV index 
metadata (its index handle, size, attributes, policy, and password) are nonvolatile; its 
data is created in volatile memory. Except for hybrid counters (described later) the index 
data is only written to NV memory on an orderly shutdown. Any of the four index types 
(ordinary, counter, bit-field, or extend) can be a hybrid index.
Hybrid indexes may be appropriate when the application expects frequent writes. 
Because NV technology is often subject to wear out, a TPM may protect itself by refusing 
to write at a high rate. Volatile memory doesn’t have wear-out issues, so a hybrid index 
can be written as often as required.
Hybrid index data may only be present in volatile memory if the index is deleted 
before an orderly shutdown. An application could define the index, write data, use the 
values in a policy, and then delete the index.
USE CASE: ADDITIONAL PCRS
the simplest use case is adding pCrs beyond the number the tpM vendor provides, 
typically 24 for a pC Client tpM. as with the permanent pCrs, the index persists 
through power cycles, but the value is reset back to zero. this means pCrs are no 
longer a scarce resource (“beach front property,” in tCG work group slang).
the tpM commands are as follows:
 • TPM2_NV_DefineSpace: hybrid extend index, well known 
null password, so that anyone can read and extend
 • TPM2_NV_Extend: Now equivalent to TPM2_PCR_Extend
USE CASE: PCRS WITH DIFFERENT ATTRIBUTES
an application requires pCrs, but the standard tpM pCrs have fixed attributes 
specified by the platform. For example, the operating system may restrict access, 
the application may want pCr authorization restrictions, the application may need 
a hash algorithm different from those in effect for the tpM pCrs, or the application 
might want extends restricted to an extended locality.
the application creates a hybrid extend index with the desired attributes,  
uses them as pCrs, and then deletes the index when the application terminates. 
Note that, because the index is a hybrid, the extend doesn’t write NV memory, 
avoiding performance and wear-out issues.
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the tpM commands are as follows:
 • TPM2_NV_DefineSpace: hybrid extend index, application-
specific digest algorithm, application-specific extend policy 
more restrictive than “anyone can extend.”
 • TPM2_NV_Extend: as needed by the application.
 • TPM2_NV_UndefineSpace: when the application 
terminates.
these pCrs can have read authorizations: policy authorizations for either read 
or write different from those of the platform. they can be used in virtual tpMs 
to record the state of a helper VM inside the vtpM of a VM (see the Virtualization 
specification).
USE CASE: VIRTUALIZATION
a VMM creates an NV extend hybrid index for each VM. When the VMM creates a 
VM, it creates a corresponding pCr using a hybrid extend index. as the VMM starts 
the VM, it uses introspection to read and measure the VM’s boot code, extending the 
measurements into the VM’s pCr.
this requires a single command:
TPM2_NV_DefineSpace: Create a hybrid extend index
Hybrid ordinary, extend, and bit-field indexes are only written to NV memory on an 
orderly shutdown. Hybrid counters are more complicated because of the restriction that 
they never roll back or miss an increment operation. This must be ensured even if the 
shutdown isn’t orderly, when the volatile value would be written to NV memory.
To achieve this, the value is written (flushed) to NV memory every so many 
increments. Thus a hybrid counter may not be solely in volatile memory, even if it’s 
deleted before an orderly shutdown. If an application wants to avoid the flush, or at least 
determine when it will occur, a get capability command can report the flush period.
The second hybrid counter complication occurs on startup. If the most recent value 
wasn’t flushed to NV (through an orderly shutdown), the count is set to the highest value 
it could have had without causing a flush. That is, it might skip some counts, but it will 
never roll back or miss an increment.
NV Access Controls
We previously discussed the major NV attributes: whether it’s an ordinary, counter, 
bit-field, or extend index, and whether it’s a hybrid index. An NV index also has unique 
controls that are different from objects like keys. Perhaps the most interesting is that it can 
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have separate controls for read and write. In particular, each index can be defined to use 
its policy, its password authorization, or the owner password or authorization, and the 
attributes can be set independently for read and write.
The TPM supports a set of NV index read and write locks. An index may be write-
locked permanently. It can be write- or read-locked until the next TPM reset or restart. 
An index may be part of one set of indexes that can be locked in one operation (a global 
lock), again until the next reset or restart.
Finally, many TPM entities are protected by the dictionary-attack protection 
mechanism. After some number of failed authorization attempts, the TPM rejects 
authorization until a certain amount of time has passed. An NV index may be protected 
as well, but an attribute can be set to remove the protection. Removing the protection 
might be applicable if the authorization password is known to be a strong secret.
NV Written
Each NV index, when first created, has an implied value: not written. In TPM 1.2, an 
index was always created with all-zero data. A read could not distinguish between all-zero 
data and a not-yet-written index. In TPM 2.0, not written is a separate state. A policy can 
specify that the index must or must not be written.
USE CASE: WRITE-ONCE NV INDEX
the creator wants an index that can be written exactly once, perhaps during 
provisioning. Once written, it can be read by anyone with the correct password.
to implement this, create an Or policy with two terms. the first term permits the 
NV Write command code only if the index has not been written. the second term 
permits a read if the index has been written and the password is supplied.
here are the steps:
      1.     Create a policy with two terms:
 • TPM2_PolicyCommandCode (TPM2_NV_Write) AND 
TPM2_PolicyNvWritten (writtenSet clear)
 • TPM2_PolicyCommandCode (TPM2_NV_Read) AND 
TPM2_PolicyPassword
      2.      TPM2_NV_DefineSpace - create an ordinary index, policy 
to write and read.
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NV Index Handle Values
When the user creates an NV index, the user assigns an index value.1 In TPM 1.2, certain 
bits had special properties, such as the D bit used for locking. In the TPM 2.0 library 
specification, there is no index assignment other than an overall handle range, and no 
bits of the index value have any special meaning. The TPM doesn’t enforce any index 
properties based on the index value. However, platform-specific specifications or a global 
TCG registry can assign index values.
For example, the TCG registry assigns handle ranges to the TPM manufacturer 
(specifically, 0 to 0x3fffff ), to the platform manufacturer, and for endorsement and 
platform certificates. It further reserves ranges for platform-specific specifications, such 
as the PC Client, server, mobile, and embedded platforms. All these assignments are by 
convention and aren’t enforced in any way by (current) TPMs.
USE CASE: STANDARD CERTIFICATES
We expect that the tCG Infrastructure work group will define standard NV indexes 
for endorsement key certificates. Whereas tpM 1.2 has two such certificates, for the 
tpM vendor and for the platform OeM, tpM 2.0 can have certificates for multiple key 
algorithms and even different creation templates.
Although the previous assignments are solely by convention, a TCG work group can 
also assign NV index values with implicit hardware properties. For example, the TPM may 
contain special hardware-package pins for general-purpose IO, called GPIO pins in the 
library and platform specifications. The platform specification determines the properties 
of the GPIO pins, including the following:
The number of pins•	
The assignment of a pin to an NV index value•	
Whether a pin is mandatory or optional•	
Whether the pin is fixed as an input or output, or is programmable•	
Whether an output is volatile or persistent•	
Whether the assignment is fixed by the TPM vendor firmware •	
during manufacturing, or the index must be defined 
programmatically by the end user using the TPM_NV_DefineSpace 
command
The NV data is a hardware pin, but the NV metadata is identical to that of other 
indexes. Thus the GPIO comes with the full range of NV index controls, including an 
authorization value or policy, read and write controls, and locking features.
1This is different from starting a session or loading an object, where the TPM assigns the handle.
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NV Names
The Name of a TPM entity uniquely (and cryptographically) defines the entity and is used for 
authorization. For an NV index, it’s a hash of the public area, which includes the index (the 
handle), the attributes (including whether it has been written), the policy, and the size.
TPM2_PolicyNV permits an NV index value to be used in a policy. The policy can be 
based on a range of logical and arithmetic operations on the index. If the policy were 
based merely on the NV index value, it would offer little security: an attacker could delete 
the index and replace it with one with different access controls. For that reason, TPM2_
PolicyNV uses the Name.
An example might help. Suppose you create an NV bit-field index that you intend 
to use for key revocation. The policy for the key includes a TPM2_PolicyNV term that can 
only be satisfied if the NV bit 0 is clear. The policy for the NV index says only the owner of 
a private key can write the index (TPM2_PolicySigned). To revoke the key, the owner signs 
a nonce to satisfy the NV policy and then sets bit 0 (TPM2_NV_SetBits).
Now suppose an attacker tries to remove the key revocation. They can’t clear 
bit 0, because a bit-field index bit can only be set, never cleared. So, the attacker tries 
something more promising: they delete the index and re-create it with exactly the same 
Name. This fails because TPM2_PolicySigned fails on an index that has not yet been 
written. The attacker can’t write the index because it can’t satisfy the NV index policy 
TPM2_PolicySigned term.
The attacker makes one final attempt. They delete the index and re-create it with a 
policy that they can satisfy. They then write the index so that bit 0 is clear and use that 
index to authorize the key’s policy using TPM2_PolicyNV. Because bit 0 is clear, it appears 
that the policy should succeed. However, the attacker had to change the policy, which 
causes the Name to change. When the new Name is used in TPM2_PolicyNV, the key’s policy 
evaluation fails.
In summary, the “delete and re-create an index” attack fails because of two TPM 
features:
An NV index can’t be used in a policy until it has been written.•	
The NV index in a policy uses the entire •	 Name (public area), not 
just the index handle.
USE CASE: WRITE ONCE, READ ALWAYS NV INDEX
the user desires to create an index that they can write exactly once and that can 
then be read by anyone. an example is provisioning the tpM with a certificate.
the index has two OR terms. the first policy term is satisfied when the index has not 
been written and the owner supplies the correct password; it permits only the NV 
write command. the second term is satisfied once the index has been written; it 
permits only the NV read command.
Another subtle point is that the Name changes when the index is written, because the 
index public area includes the written attribute.
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USE CASE: SECURING A POLICY SECRET
a policy secret permits authorization for a set of objects to be linked to a single 
secret. For example, a set of keys can have identical policies that authorize the key 
if an NV index-authorization password is known. the policy would use the NV index 
Name after it has been written.
Note ■  TPM2_PolicySecret ties authorization to the NV password. TPM2_PolicyNV ties autho-
rization to the NV data.
If the Name didn’t change when the index was written, an attacker could delete the 
index and create a new one with the same Name but their own secret and thus gain access 
to keys tied to the secret. The attack doesn’t work, because the attacker’s index has not 
been written and thus has a different Name than the one required in the key’s policy.
It’s assumed here that the NV index policy (part of the Name) prevents the attacker 
from writing the index. For example, the NV write policy might require authentication 
with a public key (TPM2_PolicySigned).
Note ■  Observe that the data value written to NV doesn’t matter and serves only to prove 
that the index creator can write the index. the key policy is tied to the NV password, not the 
NV data.
The previous use case demonstrates an interesting property. You can create an NV 
index with a Name that no one else can reproduce. If the Name includes having written 
set, and the policy is such that only you can write the index, then only you can create that 
Name. This ensures that a policy points to your NV index, not one that an attacker created.
Further, the same NV index with the same Name can be created on multiple TPMs.
USE CASE DUPLICATING A SET OF KEYS
In the previous use case, the authorization for a set of keys was tied to an NV index 
password. a user can duplicate a set of keys to another tpM. then the user can 
create an NV index with the same Name on that tpM so that the key’s policy can be 
satisfied on the new tpM.
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NV Password
A subtlety of the TPM is that a user can’t really change an object’s password. The 
TPM2_ObjectChangeAuth command can create an object with the new password, but the 
original object still exists. The user can delete all existing copies of the object, but the 
TPM can’t enforce this.
This quirk isn’t true of an NV index. The index exists only on the TPM. It can never be 
context-saved or in any way moved off the TPM. Thus, TPM2_NV_ChangeAuth really does 
change the password.
Separate Commands
The TPM API defines a set of commands dedicated to NV. TPM2_NV_DefineSpace creates 
an NV index. The caller specifies the NV metadata, including the size for an ordinary 
index, the policy, attributes, and the password. As explained earlier, a newly created index 
isn’t initialized, or written, yet. It has no data.
The write commands are as follows:
•	 TPM2_NV_Write writes an ordinary index. Depending on the 
attributes, partial writes may or may not be permitted.
•	 TPM2_NV_Increment increments a counter index. Depending 
on the attributes and the count value, this may cause a write to 
nonvolatile memory.
•	 TPM2_NV_Extend extends arbitrary data (not necessarily a hash 
value) to an extend index.
•	 TPM2_NV_SetBits sets bits in a bit-field index. It ORs the current 
value and the input. An input of all zero is legally and useful. It 
makes the index written and initializes it to all zero.
TPM2_NV_Read reads any index data. A read can only occur after the index has been 
written at least once. TPM2_NV_ReadPublic reads the index public data. In combination 
with the session audit feature, a user can get a signature over the public area to prove its 
properties.
Several commands are dedicated to locking an index. The index attributes determine 
whether these locks can be set against a particular index:
•	 TPM2_NV_WriteLock can lock an index, forbidding further writes 
until the next boot cycle or forever.
•	 TPM2_NV_GlobalWriteLock can lock a set of indexes, again either 
forever or until the next boot cycle.
•	 TPM2_NV_ReadLock locks an index, preventing further reads until 
the next boot cycle.
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TPM2_NV_ChangeAuth changes the index password. TPM2_NV_Certify can create 
a signature over index data. This command is optional in the PC Client specification. 
However, a similar result can be obtained by reading the index in an audit session and 
then getting a signed audit digest.
Summary
TPM 2.0 has four types of NV indexes: ordinary (unstructured data), bit-field, counter, 
and extend data indexes. An index can be read or written using the standard TPM 
password and policy controls. Hybrid indexes normally exist in volatile memory, but an 
orderly shutdown can save them to NV memory. They can avoid performance and wear-
out issues. When an index is created, its state is “not written”. Its data can’t be read or used 
in a policy until it’s written, and the “not written” state itself can be used on a policy.
Basic applications include provisioning with certificates or public keys. More 
advanced applications use an NV authorization in a policy, permitting it to be shared 
among entities. A policy referring to a bit-field or counter index value can be used 
for key revocation. An extend index offers PCR equivalents with different algorithms, 
authorizations, or lifetimes.
NV indexes have a separate set of commands and unique attributes to control 
authorization, read and write locking, and dictionary-attack protection.
